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MORE THAN ONE CENT FOR TRIBUTE
A Review of Fred S. McChesney, Money for Nothing:
Politicians, Rent Extraction & Political Extortion
(Harvard University Press 1997)
Gregory E. Maggs*
WILL ROGERS FAMOUSLY quipped that Americans have the best
Congress that money can buy. In his new book, Money for Nothing:
Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion, Professor Fred S.
McChesney turns this idea around. He investigates not how private parties
purchase favorable legislation from the government, but instead how they
must offer up tribute - in the form of campaign contributions and inkind
benefits - to block proposed legislation that would cost them dearly (p. 19).
Politicians, he asserts, cynically threaten to enact harmful laws simply to
extract payments from the groups whom the laws would hurt, and not
because they truly want the legislation to go into effect (p. 19). Just when
you thought you knew everything rotten about the political system,
McChesney convinces you otherwise. Congressmen and state legislators,
he shows, sell protection just like the Mob.
I
Money for Nothing builds on the previous work of others. Economists
long have recognized that businesses lobby for laws that will increase their
wealth. Sometimes firms seek legislation that will give them uncompetitive
advantages over consumers.1 Existing companies, for instance, may want
the government to establish barriers to entry, such as licensing requirements, or may seek regulation ensuring minimum prices (p. 11). At other
times, businesses will ask politicians to pass laws that will harm competitors
(pp. 14-17). For example, a producer that employs capital equipment may
support expensive regulations, such as minimum wage laws or worker
safety rules, that will increase the costs of competitors who rely more
heavily on labor (p. 15).

*

Gregory E. Maggs is an Associate Professor of Law at The George Washington University Law School. Professor Maggs thanks Professor Peter B. Maggs for
his helpful comments and suggestions.
1
See pp. 9-13 (summarizing pathbreaking work by economist George Stigler).
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McChesney, however, has a different focus in his economic study. He
concentrates on another*102 goal of lobbying, namely, persuading
legislators not to enact laws. He observes that private parties not only may
want favorable laws, but also may fear that the government will adopt
legislation that will harm them. For instance, Congress may create new
rules that limit their output or reduce the price they can receive for it (pp.
26-28). Other troublesome laws simply may increase their costs, such as by
raising taxes (pp. 29-32).
Private parties, McChesney observes, presently expend large sums of
money simply to avoid wealth reducing regulation. He notes, for example,
that Citicorp employs eight registered lobbyists and six law firms in
Washington almost exclusively for the purpose of persuading Congress not
to impose burdens on its credit card, student loan, and financial services
business (p. 2). Despite the political importance of this kind of lobbying
against legislation, economists have not studied it adequately (p. 19).
McChesney offers what he considers a fairly uncontroversial analysis of
the financial calculation behind a business’s decision to fight unfavorable
legislation. He theorizes that private parties facing the threat of regulation
will compare the costs of lobbying to the costs that new legislation will
impose on them. “If the threatened cost of the act exceeds the value of what
private parties must give up to avoid legislative action,” he predicts, “they
rationally will surrender the tribute demanded of them” (p. 22). For
example, Citicorp gladly would contribute thousands of dollars to Republican and Democratic candidates to persuade them not to enact credit card
regulations that might cost them far more in terms of lost profit.
In fact, McChesney believes that private parties often worry more about
avoiding harmful regulations than about obtaining beneficial legislation. He
explains that the decreasing marginal utility of wealth makes laws that
might reduce profits by one dollar matter more than laws that could raise
profits by the same amount. Money spent on lobbying against laws,
moreover, may have a greater effect than money spend lobbying for them.
In many instances, lobbyists will have an easier time persuading politicians
not to pass a bill, than to enact one (p. 22).
Unlike other commentators who have considered the issue of lobbying,
McChesney pays considerable attention to the motivations of politicians. He
theorizes that politicians act in economically rational ways, taking actions
that best will increase their wealth. He hypothesizes that politicians want
lobbying money because much of it ultimately ends up in their own pockets.
McChesney says that, despite campaign reform efforts, “little practical
distinction exists between spending of funds donated for campaign
objectives as opposed to personal use” (p. 49). He recounts how politicians
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have used campaign funds to buy cars, food, housing, and entertainment. In
addition, he notes, members of Congress often receive handsome speech
and appearance fees and lavish in-kind benefits, such as travel and
recreation opportunities (pp. 50-53).
The ability of politicians to obtain payment to not enact laws, McChesney believes, explains some of the actions that they take. Many legislators
propose bills that they later withdraw or that ultimately do not pass. Why
would they do that? McChesney suspects that politicians introduce these
bills as a way of shaking down the parties that the bills would affect (p. 19).
They threaten harmful legislation in hopes that businesses will cough up
some lobbying money to block it. Apologizing for technical terminology,
he notes that economists would describe this type of antisocial behavior as
“rent extraction” (p. 2).
To support his theory, McChesney describes the Illinois legislature’s
routine practice of considering “fetcher bills.” These bills typically threaten
to impose a new type of tax or to ban sale of a certain type of product for
the purpose of “fetching” rich treatment from lobbyists*103 who oppose the
measure (p. 30). In California, legislators call such proposals “milker bills”
(p. 29). As an example at the federal level, McChesney discusses at length
President Clinton’s proposed health care reform measures (pp. 77-78;
83-85). He shows that the proposal extracted considerable wealth from
pharmaceutical makers who spent vast sums lobbying out of fear that
enactment of the reforms would reduce their wealth.
The rent extraction theory also may explain some other actions that
legislators take. McChesney speculates that Congress creates entitlement
programs in part to give its members opportunities for demanding payoffs.
He explains that politicians may like to foster dependency on government
programs because they can extract payments from lobbyists whenever they
threaten to curtail them (pp. 123-24).
McChesney concludes by discussing briefly the question whether the
law should prohibit rent extraction (pp. 168-70). Although he considers the
practice deplorable (p. 2), he worries that an outright ban might do more
harm than good. He reasons that if members of Congress or state legislators
could not take money to refrain from passing laws, they simply might enact
more harmful regulations (p. 169). Americans, in other words, very well
might need the protection that they are paying for.
II
The central idea of Money for Nothing - that businesses spend money to
avoid regulations - is not really something new. Although economists may
not have studied the topic rigorously, government watchers long have
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known that lobbyists try to stop legislative initiatives. The media, for
instance, regularly reports how the tobacco industry blocks anti-smoking
legislation,2 how the trial lawyers block product liability legislation,3 how
the securities and insurance industries block legislation that would allow
banks to compete with them, 4 and how banks block pro-consumer
legislation.5 These industries, needless to say, already understand the
economic principles at stake. They would not spend money on negative
lobbying unless they thought it would save them more money in the long
run.
Most lawyers, nonetheless, would benefit from reading McChesney’s
analysis of the political process. Attorneys tend to respect legislation as the
final product of the democratic process. Bills that pass through Congress
and the President have the status of law, while mere legislative proposals do
not. Naturally, what Congress has enacted seems more important than what
it has not. The same holds true at the state level.
McChesney wisely questions this customary way of thinking. Private
parties, as noted, often care more about blocking unfavorable legislation
than about getting favorable legislation passed. Moreover, when a bill does
become a law, its passage actually may reflect the failure of the political
process. In many cases, an enactment does not mean that politicians have
accomplished their activities. Instead, it may indicate only that someone
failed to shell out sufficient contributions to block a bill that *104 no one
really wanted.
Another strong attribute of the book is its accessibility. McChesney has
kept his study concise and easygoing despite including technical economic
analysis. He has a fine sense of humor, reflected in the witty epigrams at the
start of each chapter and the occasional cartoon that he has included.

2

See, e.g., Phil Kuntz, The Settlement: Pact Sends Powerful Lobby On Its Way
to the Ash Can, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1997, at BIO (describing the activities of
the Tobacco Institute).
3
See, e.g., John Harwood, GOP Sponsor Sees Victory on Product Liability
Revision, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 1995, at A7F (describing efforts by trial lawyers
to block product liability reform legislation).
4
See, e.g., Kenneth H. Bacon, New Clash by Banks and Securities Firms Delays
Bid to Aid Deposit Insurance Fund, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1991, at AI (describing
how the lobbyists for the securities and insurance industries block legislation that
would allow banks to compete with them).
5
See, e.g., Kenneth H. Bacon, For Citicorp, Which Has Largest Lobbying
Force In Banking Industry, Victories Are Won Quietly, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14,
1993, at A18.
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Although the book is well worth reading overall, some parts of McChesney’s analysis seem problematic. One area of difficulty relates to McChesney’s thesis that politicians routinely introduce bills to obtain contributions
from the private parties whom the bill adversely would affect. Although
what the author describes may happen in some instances, the opposite also
may occur. Often when a politician threatens to tax or regulate private
parties, the parties respond by donating money to the politician’s opponents.
For example, when Republicans propose tort reform legislation or want
to cut the rate of Medicare growth, the American Trial Lawyers Association
and the American Association of Retired Persons increase their donations
to Democrats. Likewise, when Democrats threaten to reform the health care
system, pharmaceutical companies increase their donations to Republicans.
In these cases, something other than what McChesney has addressed must
explain the politicians’ motivations.
Another difficulty relates to McChesney’s contention that politicians
personally benefit from campaign contributions. McChesney ex-aggerates
a little in suggesting that almost no practical difference exists between
campaign contributions and personal expenses. Misusing campaign funds
has led to criminal prosecutions in cases at both the federal and state level.
The Justice Department, for example, indicted the former Chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee, Daniel J. Rostenkowski, for spending
campaign funds for personal use and then misrepresenting the expenditures
to the Federal Election Commission.6 The State of Alabama, in addition,
convicted its former Governor, Harold Guy Hunt, for using what he
considered campaign funds for personal expenses.7 Other politicians have
suffered similar fates.8 Accordingly, McChesney needs to explain what else
besides personal gain from campaign contributions motivates politicians
when they propose harmful bills.
These problems, however, must be kept in perspective. As one of the
first economists to study in depth how private parties make payments to
avoid regulation, McChesney has broken new ground and written a
provocative book. He openly acknowledges that several important questions

6

See United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Rostenkowski later entered a plea bargain agreement in which he pleaded guilty to
two counts of mail fraud in exchange for having the other charges against him
dropped. See What’s News, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1996, at AI.
7
See Ex parte Hunt v. Alabama, 642 So.2d 1060, 1064 (Ala. 1994).
8
See United States v. Blanford, 33 F.3d 685, 701 (6th Cir. 1994) (conviction of
state legislator on racketeering charges for spending campaign funds for personal
use).
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remain unanswered (pp. 159-165). With luck, he will find the time to
address the subject again, and to direct more light on the sinister racket that
our leaders are running.

